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Abstract—Democracy in the digital age has attracted a lot of
public attention in recent years. However, bringing the human
right of secrecy in voting to electronic systems is difficult.
Properties, such as the possibility of verifying universally that any
vote counted was indeed carrying the decision made by a voter,
are often conflicting and a trade-off must be found. This paper
proposes a blockchain-based electronic voting system providing
explicitly cast-as-intended verifiability. By using a non-interactive
zero-knowledge proof of knowledge any voter can verify that his
or her encrypted vote represents the decision voted for while
maintaining at the same time the secrecy of the ballot. In addition,
any required cryptographic material can be generated in linear
time with respect to the number of voters, making the system
suitable for large scale elections, thus scalable.
I. INTRODUCTION
Participating in voting and elections is a phenomenon which
determines the fundamentals of democracy since centuries.
However, different means have been used to cast a vote. From
a spoken word, raising hands, to papyrus or paper, a multitude
of representations for a ballot are known and used. In the last
two decades, also electronic ways for casting a vote have been
evaluated and introduced in electoral processes. From 1996
to 2007, only a total of 136 elections used a form of remote
electronic voting [1], besides the uncounted ones of association
internal elections of presidents, officers, or members of a
board. Since then, advances in technology have lead to further
trials and binding.
In Europe, efforts for introducing electronic voting have
succeeded in a few countries. For example, Estonian citizens
can submit votes over the Internet based on their previously
established usage of a digital identity called SmartID [2]. Es-
tonia has seen legally-binding electronic voting since 2005 [3]
and also Switzerland has been experimenting with electronic
voting channels since the beginning of the 21st century [4].
Although voices raised that electronic voting increases voter
turnout, others state that only insignificant changes have been
observed. With electronic voting channels, the key question
of trust arises as soon as intangible ballots are submitted.
Democracies with their checks and balances may already pro-
vide trusted means of voting. However, the recent presidential
election of the United States of America in 2016 has shown
that in long living democracies trust concerns in elections
occur [5]. In other countries, transparent electronic voting
systems are even considered the only means of conducting
trustful elections [6].
Instead of relying on the honesty of an administering
governmental entity, decentralized structures with independent
implementations of a particular process cannot only distribute
the risk of being attacked successfully, but might also increase
the immediacy of a voter’s participation in elections. With
the publication of Bitcoin [7] in late 2008, decentralized
ledgers have shown great potential for different IT systems
and applications. Attempts to implement electronic voting on
top of such a decentralized structure have been seen in the past
[8], [9]. Although properties for evaluating pivotal require-
ments exists, few approaches take them into consideration.
In particular, coercion-resistance and receipt-freeness, ballot
secrecy, and verifiability of each submitted vote must be taken
into account [10], [11]. With a country’s federal structure, one
fundamental requirement for decentralized electronic voting is
already recognized: Distributing parts of the voting process
to multiple authorities. Thus, establishing a similar structure
for an electronic voting system seems to be the only logical
consequence.
Once a vote is cast, it must be ensured that it represents
the actual choice made by a voter, i.e., whether the vote was
cast as intended. In contrast to a paper ballot voting, electronic
devices may alter votes invisibly to the end-user or they even
might execute a different protocol from the one expected to
be in use. This characteristic of all election systems - paper-
based and electronic ones - is commonly referred to as ”cast-
as-intended verifiability” [10]. An electronic voting system
providing recorded-as-cast and tallied-as-recorded verifiability
combined with cast-as-intended verifiability, is said to be end-
to-end verifiable [10].
Current implementations of electronic voting systems pro-
viding cast-as-intended verifiability commonly require multi-
ple interactive steps by users [9], [8], [12]. Although maintain-
ing state in a decentralized network is possible (e.g., by using
a distributed hash table), decentralized ledgers act in terms
of transactions. Thus, this work designs CaIV, a blockchain-
based electronic voting system using the universal cast-as-
intended verifiability [13], represented in a self-contained
manner within a single transaction per vote.
Therefore, after a brief review of related work in Section II.
Section IV introduces the proposed design. Further, discussion
and future work are presented in Section V.978-1-7281-1328-9/19/$31.00 c©2019 IEEE
II. RELATED WORK
The Swiss Post distributes within Switzerland its eVoting
solution with an implementation based on return codes [14].
Votes can be submitted by prior authorization to the voting
server. Based on the ballot received, a set of return codes
is generated and transmitted to the voter. These return codes
must be verified by the voter before submitting a confirmation
message to the voting server again. Subsequently, a finalization
code is generated, stored, and sent back to the voter. A vote is
considered to be successfully received, if the finalization code
matches an equivalent on the printed voting card [9].
Likewise, the canton of Geneva in Switzerland uses a similar
end-user process, but a different implementation. Before votes
are decrypted and tallied, they are mixed and partially de-
crypted by a set of voting authorities. These partially decrypted
values are then retrieved by an election administrator and
converted back to plain-text values. Finally, these values are
summed up to calculate the final tally [8].
A feasibility study of a boardroom voting solution based on
a Smart Contract (SC) running on the Ethereum blockchain is
presented in [15]. A a Public Bulletin Board (PBB) stores
all the election information. Votes are encrypted prior to
sending them to the Ethereum network. Further, a 1-out-
of-2 zero-knowledge proof ensures that the encrypted vote
contains either a zero or one vote. The entire voting process
includes a setup, sign-up, commit (optional), vote, and tally
phase, of which the sign-up, commit, and vote phase have
to be performed by the voter. Participants have to announce
their private voting key during the sign-up phase and then
commit to their voting option chosen by publishing a hash
of their encrypted vote. Voters can send this vote and the
zero-knowledge proof in a transaction to the SC. The major
drawback is that the self-tallying voting protocol allows the
last voter to abort the entire election.
[16] proposes an electronic voting solutions based on ring
signatures on the Bitcoin blockchain. After a two-step reg-
istration phase, the voter is signed up for participating in
the election. During voting each participant has to retrieve
all public keys of all other voters, which he will use in
combination with its own private key in order to sign the
election option chosen. A commitment is sent to the Bitcoin
address of the election authority. To tally, the voting authorities
collect all transactions retrieved and verify their signature. If
these are valid, the corresponding counter for a particular can-
didate option is increased. The paper claims to have fulfilled
individual verifiability, however, no formal proof is provided.
Agora [17] has performed a trial voting on their blockchain-
based implementation of an electronic voting system for the
presidential elections in Sierra Leone. As registered election
observers, members of Agora were allowed to manually reg-
ister votes in 280 polling stations [17], [18].
III. CAST-AS-INTENDED VERIFIABILITY (CAIV)
CaIV allow voters to take political action in an uncontrolled
decentralized environment (i.e., the Internet). Therefore, it is
best categorized as eVoting within the classification of New
Voting Technology introduced by [19]. As such, the system
requires at least two bodies operating different components
during an election: Voting authorities, which operate a com-
ponent to manage, store, tally votes, and code executed on the
Voters’ end-clients, such as a computer.
Maintaining durable connections between nodes in a dis-
tributed system is not straightforward: Nodes can disconnect
from the network at any time due to many reasons. Therefore,
using a protocol for the cast-as-intended verifiability, which
requires only a single interaction, is preferable. Indeed, the
protocol outlined in [13] allows to submit a vote in a single
step and is considered a good fit for this problem.
In eVoting systems, a variety of data is usually made avail-
able on a public accessible storage: Not only public-private
key-pairs used for encrypting votes, but also information
required for providing verifiability or proofs for the validity of
the final tally. According to [20], [10], such a Public Bulletin
Board (PBB) provides the following properties:
1) It is an append-only data structure, i.e., information
cannot be modified or altered.
2) It is public in the sense of being searchable by anyone.
3) It is consistent in its view for anyone accessing its
information.
However, Smart Contracts (SCs) running on Ethereum pose
limitations to perform cryptographic operations: (i) Data types
are only capable of storing a limited number of bytes and
(ii) they are not supporting an implementation for big integers.
Thus, eVoting based on the homomorphic ElGamal cryptosys-
tem operating on finite cyclic groups of integers is, thus,
infeasible as it relies on a large enough prime numbers as its
modulus. However, a custom tailored blockchain as designed
in this work, can take into account the verification of proofs
defined in cyclic fields of integers.
IV. CAIV DESIGN
CaIV is structured into four main modules. The module
crypto_rs provides the arithmetic foundation on which the
additive homomorphic ElGamal cryptosystem is built. In ad-
dition, the implementations of non-interactive zero-knowledge
proofs are contained. The generator_rs module creates
all necessary cryptographic parameters, such as the private
and public UCIV information and the election public-private
key-pair. node_rs provides the PBB implemented as a
blockchain, whereas client_rs provides all functionality
to administrate and participate in the election.
A. The crypto-rs Module
crypto_rs module provides an implementation of mod-
ular arithmetics in cyclic groups, an ElGamal ciphertext and
a corresponding key-pair, and the NIZKPK (Non-Interactive
Zero Knowledge Proofs) to verify the ciphertexts.
Based on ModInt, a data structure providing modular
arithmetic, the additive variant of the homomorphic ElGamal
ciphertext is specified by G,H and the random number
r used during encryption. The encryption, decryption, and
homomorphic addition are implemented as follows: Define the
message space of all valid plain-text votes to be in the cyclic
subgroup G of order q of (Zp)
∗, with q being co-prime to p
and g being the generator of G. Continue as follows:
1) Create a private key by selecting a random number x






2) Create the corresponding public key, by calculating h =
gx. Make the set
(
G, q, g, h
)
public.
3) Encrypt a message m ∈ Zp using r ∈uniform Zp with the
public key h by calculating the shared secret s = hr =
(gx)r = gxr. Then, the resulting ciphertext is defined as
E(G,H) =
(
gr, gm · s
)
.
4) Decrypt a ciphertext E(G,H), by recalculating the secret
s = Gx = (gr)x = grx and gm = H · (s−1) = gm · hr ·
(gxr)−1 = gm · gxr · g−xr with s−1 being the modular
multiplicative inverse of s. Solve the discrete logarithm
in order to obtain m.
Having obtained two ElGamal ciphertexts E(m1) and
E(m2) the homomorphic addition can be performed:
E(m1) · E(m2) = E(G1, H1) · E(G2, H2)
= E(gr1 , gm1 · hr1) · E(gr2 , gm2 · hr2)
= E(gr1+r2 , gm1+m2 · hr1+r2)
= E(m1 +m2)
In order to transform the ElGamal range proof to its
non-interactive form, the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [21] is used.
Similarly to the range proof, [13] defines the cast-as-intended
verification proof in its non-interactive form.
B. The generator-rs Module
The generator_rs is able to generate all cryptographic
material, such as the private and public UCIV information and
the election key-pair. However, creating a new ElGamal key-
pair is not yet cryptographically safe: As of today, there is
no safe prime generator available for the BigInt abstrac-
tion applied. In other words, the prime modulus p, its co-
prime q, the private key x are currently hard-coded. Thus,
generator_rs is a best-effort solution for being able to
process the entire voting procedure. However, this must be
replaced once an implementation may become available.
C. The node-rs Module
The implementation of the blockchain acting as PBB is
provided in node_rs. Thus, it requires crypto_rs as
dependency, providing it with the data structures on which
transactions and blocks are built upon. Figure 1 shows its com-
ponents: 1 Blockchain nodes communicate using the Node
RPC interface. 2 Votes are submitted to a dedicated
Client RPC interface. Besides two threads listening
for incoming connections, a thread pool 3 also runs another
thread, signing blocks if the node is a leader or co-leader. 4
The Clique Protocol Handler operates on the Proof-
of-Authority level, where it handles incoming messages and
corresponding responses, creates transactions and blocks, and
decides whether the node is a leader or co-leader for the
Fig. 1: CaIV architecture. 1 2 denote the external communi-
cation interfaces. 3 depicts a thread signing blocks. 4 is the
actual proof-of-authority protocol handler with its transaction
buffer 5 and the blockchain 6 .
current epoch. In addition, it holds a transaction buffer 5 and
its own instance of the actual blockchain 6 .
The configuration module contains utilities to read
all configuration required into a representation, which can be
used as a genesis block for the blockchain. Among a version
flag, it contains the block period for the Clique protocol [22],
the number of blocks each node in the network is allowed
to sign consecutively, the election public key pke, and the
public UCIV information ucivp required to verify the cast-
as-intended-verification proof of any transaction. During the
runtime instantiation of the Clique protocol, the genesis block
is hashed and the resulting value used to determine whether
a node in the network is based on the same configuration. If
a configuration value is different, also the hash will become
different and, thus, nodes will never agree on the same
canonical chain. Therefore, nodes with a different genesis
block hash are excluded from communications.
The data of the blockchain itself is stored on the heap.
Instead of using a tree-based data structure to build up the
chain, an adjacent matrix is created, containing on the y-axis
all block identifiers and on the x-axis corresponding children
identifiers of the block. This ensures O(1) cost when looking
up a particular key.
D. The client-rs Module
In the current design, all functionality for administrating
elections, submitting votes, and obtaining a final tally is
combined into the one client application client-rs.
E. Vote Administration
Election authorities open and close the election by sending
an OpenVote and CloseVote message to the bulletin
board, respectively. Incoming vote transactions will only be
counted towards the final tally, if the election is opened and
ignored otherwise. To submit a vote, voters only need to be in
possession of the election public key pke and their associated
private and public UCIV information pair (ucivs, ucivp)
vid.
Voters can type either yes or no as answer to the voting ques-
tion. This value is transformed in to its binary representation 1
or 0, respectively. This binary vote is further encrypted on the
voter’s client device, and the range proofs as well as the cast-
as-intended verification proof are created. Before submitting
the vote to the blockchain, both proofs are validated and the
vote is submitted to a node of the voting network only if the
proof validation is successful.
Once the election has been closed by voting authorities, the
final tally can be calculated. By sending a RequestTally
to a blockchain node, a traversal from the root to the end
of its current canonical chain is initiated. Each block’s vote
transactions TV are homomorphically summed up. Before-
hand, each vote transaction is validated by their associated
proofs. In case a proof fails to evaluate successfully, the
transaction is counted toward invalid votes. Once the entire
canonical chain has been traversed, a response containing the
amount of successful, invalid and total votes is returned. If
no CloseVote transaction is observed during the traversal
of the canonical chain, zero-values are returned for the above
metrics.
V. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
Although a secure electronic voting system is of absolute
necessity, the integrity of the voting question itself is crucial as
well. Tampering with its linguistic structure, such as negating
or rephrasing it entirely, can affect the outcome of the elec-
tion effectively. Thus, storing it on a distributed ledger can
substantially reduce such a risk.
Besides the cast-as-intended verifiability, recorded-as-cast
verifiability can be ensured as well too: If a voter obtains the
identifier of the transaction submitted to the blockchain, it can
be queried after submission. As such, the voter can verify
the associated proofs for correctness. However, as transactions
are not signed with a voter-dependent value the integrity
verification of the vote on the blockchain becomes poor. Also,
the transaction’s integrity can be verified by computing the
hash of the transaction before submitting it to the blockchain
and then asserting for equality during verification.
Counted-as-recorded verifiability is not yet provided by
the implementation proposed as this work primarily focused
on providing cast-as-intended verifiability. The current voting
protocol can be extended in the last step by (a) computing
a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge for the
correct tabulation and (b) publishing it to the bulletin board.
Individual verifiability can be provided if the voter has a
means of retrieving his/her vote from the blockchain and eval-
uating it for correctness using the associated proofs. Universal
verifiability may be provided, if a tabulation proof of the final
tally is published to the PBB. Due to these limitations, the
implementation performed and run in a test set-up does not
yet fulfil the end-to-end verifiability completely.
Although votes are locally encrypted on voters’ end-user
devices, election authorities are still able to decrypt individual
votes, if they have a means of querying the blockchain for
individual transactions. As this is suggested for providing
recorded-as-cast verifiability, it will be hard to refuse this
access to election authorities, especially as they provide the
infrastructure running the blockchain. One can overcome this
limitation by establishing multiparty computation as suggested
in [13]. Also, [13] states additionally that the suggested
voting protocol on which this work is based on, trusts the
election authorities for privacy reasons, a partially debatable
assumption.
Thus, the CaIV shows that by storing the non-interactive
zero-knowledge proof of knowledge [13] on the blockchain,
cast-as-intended verifiability is guaranteed while still main-
taining a limited notion of privacy. In addition, tabulation
of the final tally is performed directly on the blockchain,
distributing the trust for its integrity among multiple au-
thorities. However, the opposing properties of verifiability
and privacy also revealed challenges for providing recorded-
as-cast and counted-as-recorded verifiability in a distributed
setup: Ballot privacy can be reduced by homomorphically
tabulating directly on the blockchain. With respect to Swiss
national elections and voting, extensions to the current proof-
of-concept implementation must be provided in order to fulfil
the fundamental property of end-to-end verifiability.
Additional implementation-specific aspects require attention
prior to performing a nationwide election. For example, per-
forming the homomorphic addition on the blockchain leaks
information about the randomness of the ciphertext in a public
manner, which is achieved by reducing the solution space
that an adversary needs to consider when trying to decrypt
a vote. In other words, an adversary would need to explore
less solutions to decrypt a ciphertext and correlate an id
with a vote. Also, in a production-ready application incoming
messages are to be signed with an asymmetric key-pair by
each election authority. Thus, illegitimate requests attempted
by non-authority entities can be filtered out. Finally, although
empty votes can occur by voters who register to vote but never
submit a decision to the voting network, voting for one or even
multiple options shall be considered, which has to be extended
for write in-names and candidates, too.
Although a blockchain can provide trust among different
authorities, the cryptographic procedures to ensure a secure
and integer vote are highly complex. Critics of eVoting systems
argue that a large part of the electorate will not be able to
understand the verifiability properties in detail. Thus, future
work also needs to show whether a more human readable kind
of verifiability can be constructed.
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